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In his superb book, The Metaphysics of Representation, Williams sketches
biconditional reductive definitions of representational states in non-
representational terms (xvii).1 The central idea is an extremely innovative
variety of interpretationism about belief and desire. Williams is inspired by
David Lewis but departs significantly from him.
I am sympathetic to interpretationism for some basic beliefs and desires.
However, I will raise three worries for Williams’s version (§2–4). Then, I will
suggest a modified version (§5). I will conclude with a general question (§6).
1. Williams’s multistage interpretationism
To illustrate Williams’s account, imagine that we have travelled back in time and
are radically interpreting Sally, one of our prelinguistic hominid ancestors.
Donald Davidson’s interpretationism started from an agent’s disposition to
‘hold-true’ certain sentences of her public language, so that prelinguistic Sally is
not interpretable as having beliefs and desires at all. Against this, Williams (xi)
holds that she does have beliefs and desires. But how do we pin down their
contents?
The first stage of Williams’s theory (167ff) concerns source intentionality:
prelinguistic Sally’s perceptions and decisions. For example, suppose that
there is a ripe tomato in front of her and she picks it from the vine. Her
perception has the content there is red and round thing there. Her decision
has the content I will move my hand in direction d.
Some hold that source intentionality is a matter of internally determined ‘ex-
periential intentionality’. Williams considers this idea but rejects it (13, 168).
Instead, Williams explains source intentionality using Karen Neander’s
externalist-teleological theory of perceptual content. Sally undergoes an inner
physical state N (a functionally defined ‘perception’) that has the biological func-
tion of being caused by a round thing with a red-reflectance. This gives her a
reason to believe that such a thing is there. Sally also undergoes inner physical
state A that has the function of causing her to move her hand in direction d.2
1 All references are to Williams 2020 unless otherwise noted.
2 Williams holds that source intentionality is quite ‘low-level’ or ‘thin’ (183, 178). Williams
might also include memories (perhaps identified with spontaneous judgements) in source
intentionality (181, n. 16).
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In the second stage, Williams goes from source intentionality to Sally’s
beliefs and desires. In the case of belief, the idea is:
Williams’s interpretationism. For any possible subject A, A has a (core)
belief that p iff A is in a distinct repeatable inner state s such that (i) s plays
the belief-role and (ii) the most rationalizing interpretation (given source
intentionality) assigns to s the content that p (33).
In the case of actual humans, Williams’s account requires at various places that
the relevant internal states are sentences in an inner language of thought (LOT)
that she cannot experience (11, 40, 50, 156). So while prelinguistic Sally lacks an
outer language that she can experience, she has a hidden inner language.
This resembles Jerry Fodor’s two-part story: a person believes that p just in
case (i) inner sentence s is in their ‘belief-box’ and (ii) s means that p (33, 40).3
But whereas Fodor explains (ii) in terms of ‘asymmetric dependence’, Williams
explains (ii) using rationality maximization.4
What is the ‘rationality maximizing’ assignment? It is the assignment that over-
all maximizes Sally’s structural rationality (e.g. means-end coherence) and sub-
stantive rationality (e.g. reason-responsiveness), given source intentionality (16ff).
For example, let’s grant that prelinguistic Sally has a hidden LOT. When
Sally views the tomato and picks it from the vine, there are two inner sentences
s1 and s2 that mediate between her perception and her action in a way dis-
tinctive of a belief and a desire. One perverse interpretation rationalizes her
action by assigning the (clearly false) content a chunk of mud is there to s1 and
the content I will eat a chunk of mud to s2. But the interpretation that also
maximizes Sally’s substantive rationality will instead assign the contents
a tomato is there and I will eat a tomato. So Sally believes that a tomato is
there and she desires that she will eat it.
The third and final stage concerns the content of outer language (119ff). To
illustrate, suppose we determined the contents of prelinguistic Sally’s beliefs and
desires. Presumably, they are limited. Then something new happens. Sally and her
group invent an outer language. The language becomes increasingly sophisti-
cated. At the same time, she comes to have increasingly sophisticated beliefs
and desires.
What determines the representational properties of Sally’s outer language?
This raises one of philosophy’s chicken-or-egg problems: in the order of ex-
planation, what comes first, thought or outer language? Evidently, Sally’s
simple beliefs are prior to outer language. Williams (146–47) endorses a
stronger claim: all belief content is metaphysically prior to the content of outer
3 Williams does not discuss part (i) of the two-part theory. He does not offer a general func-
tional account of what it is for an inner sentence to be in Sally’s belief-box or desire-box.
4 Williams focuses on certain sub-sentential terms of LOT (e.g., logical constants, moral terms).
He has less to say about what determines LOT’s grammar and hence the full contents of all of
LOT’s sentences.
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language (even if they develop together). Call this a general mind-first ap-
proach to belief as opposed to an outer-language-first approach. Then, follow-
ing David Lewis, Williams derives the content of outer language from the
content of belief, via conventions (119ff).
Why think that constraints of rationality are constitutive of content?
Williams offers no master argument. If his theory delivers correct verdicts, it
may be along the right lines.
2. First worry: neglecting consciousness
Prelinguistic Sally views a tomato. Following Karen Neander, Williams holds
that Sally’s perceptually representing that a round thing is there is a wide affair
that is not fixed by her total intrinsic state. Furthermore, by having a percep-
tion with this wide content, she has a reason to believe that a round thing is
there. So the most rationalizing interpretations will tend to assign to her the
belief that a round thing is there. In short, his account of how perception helps
fix belief can be put like this:
wide content! reason! belief
But the following argument suggests that Neander-style wide content can-
not be the whole story:
(1) When she views the tomato, Sally’s conscious experience has a content
there is a reddish and round thing there that is inseparable from its
phenomenology.
(2) Phenomenology is narrow.
(3) Therefore, in addition to having a wide content determined by causal-
teleological relations to the environment, Sally’s experience has a nar-
row experiential content that is inseparable from its phenomenology.
Premiss 1 is based on reflection on experience and is generally accepted.
Phenomenal externalists reject Premiss 2. But research in psychophysics and
neuroscience provides an overwhelming case for it. So perceptual source in-
tentionality includes narrow experiential intentionality (Pautz 2013, 2021a).
Williams’s reductive externalist account borrowed from Neander does not
apply to such internally determined experiential source intentionality. So if
Williams wishes to uphold biconditional reductive definitions of all representa-
tional facts (xvii), he needs an alternative internalist reductive account here: sub-
ject S experientially represents narrow content p iff ___. This has proven difficult
to provide, because standard models for reducing representational relations are
externalist.5
5 Williams’s interpretationism invokes normativity. He allows that normative facts may be
grounded in physical-natural facts even though biconditional reductions are unavailable
(13). So why not a parallel view of experiential representation? Perhaps the fact that Sally
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The argument puts pressure on Williams’s view about the source of perceptual
reasons. For, intuitively, Sally has a reason to believe that a round thing is there
simply by virtue of experientially representing that a round thing is there, where
this is matter of how the world phenomenally appears to her. The argument
shows that this is a narrow affair. By contrast, on Williams’s view, Sally has a
reason to believe that a round thing is there by virtue of Neander-representing that
a round thing is there, where this is wide affair involving her being in an internal
physical state that is normally caused by a round thing in the external world. Since
phenomenology is narrow, this is totally independent of how the world phenom-
enally appears to her. So Williams’s view becomes less plausible. At least, he
neglects a plausible ‘narrow’ source of perceptual reasons.
So here is another interpretationist model of how perception fixes belief:
narrow experiential content! reason! belief
Sally’s internally determined conscious experiences (pleasures, pains, gus-
tatory experiences and feelings) may also play a role in providing Sally with
reasons for desiring certain things or preferring one thing to another (Pautz
2021a: 288–89, 2021b). The ‘best interpretation’ will then assign to her
desires that are ‘reasonable’ given her affective experiences.
At the end of §1, I asked, ‘Why accept Williams’ view that substantive
rationality plays a role in grounding belief and desire?’ Let me mention one
explanatory virtue. Intuitively, if it experientially appears to you that a red and
round thing is right there, you are apt to believe that such a thing is there – that
content becomes a belief magnet. It is then very hard not to believe this con-
tent. Likewise, if you have horrible pain, you are apt to desire that it stop. And,
intuitively, such connections are not merely contingent but metaphysically
necessary. But why? This can be explained by the reason-grounding role of
consciousness together with Williams’s reason-responsive theory of beliefs
and desires, as follows: (i) it is in the essence of your conscious experiences
to provide reasons for beliefs and desires and (ii) it is in the essence of your
beliefs and desires that they tend to be congruent with your reasons (for in the
absence of countervailing behavioural dispositions the ‘most rationalizing’
interpretations will assign beliefs and desires congruent with your reasons).
3. Second worry: do beliefs and desires depend on hidden facts?
Theories of beliefs and desire fall into two vague categories. On one side are
theories that mostly ground beliefs and desires in surface-level facts. By sur-
face-level facts, I mean a rough miscellany that includes not only facts access-
ible from the outside but also experiences, imagery, conscious doings,
experientially represents so-and-so is grounded in the fact that she is in a certain narrow brain
state without being reducible to that fact. All representational facts are grounded in (but not
reducible to) non-representational facts.
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acceptances of outer sentences inner speech, and causal-inferential relations be-
tween these things. Gilbert Ryle’s view was a paradigmatic example. Recent
phenomenal intentionality theories are also in this camp (Chalmers 2012: 463–
67, Mendelovici 2018, Pautz 2021a). On the other side are theories that signifi-
cantly appeal to ‘hidden facts’. Fodor’s hidden LOT view is an example.
Williams holds that certain hidden facts are crucial to the grounding story.
This makes it open to two problems.
3.1 First problem
Williams’s state-based form of interpretationism (§1) implies the inner isomorph-
ism constraint: as a matter of metaphysical necessity, an agent has beliefs only if
there is a one-one mapping between those beliefs and a system of inner states
(representation-vehicles) causally mediating between experiences and behaviours
(33–34).6 Likewise for desires. These mediating states will be subpersonal and
hidden. For instance, when an animal experiences the world and acts on it, the
system of mediating inner states realizing its beliefs and desires are not experi-
enced. Williams gives an a priori argument for the constraint: any possible
Blockhead (an insentient robot that outwardly looks like a human but that works
by a giant look-up table) lacks beliefs and desires only because it violates the
constraint (33–35). Therefore, he rejects the Lewis–Stalnaker view that a single
time-slice of an agent might be assigned many beliefs and desires (33).
I think that Williams’s inner isomorphism constraint is too strong. Here are
two illustrations.
Imagine that you are a primitive pre-human of our actual past – say homo
habilis – with many basic beliefs and desires. In fact, you satisfy the inner
isomorphism constraint: you have a distinct brain state for each one. But
now imagine a twin in another possible world with the same experiences
and behavioural dispositions as you. The only difference is that, in your
twin, they are mediated by a connectionist network. We stipulate that the
network is not decomposable into distinct states that are ‘isomorphic’ to
your own mediating brain states here in the actual world, even at an abstract
upper-level. So Williams’s constraint implies that your homo habilis twin lacks
beliefs and desires for the same reason it implies that Blockhead does: he fails
to satisfy the inner isomorphism constraint. But that is implausible. For in-
stance, when your twin has a vivid experience of a tomato and reaches for it,
your twin surely believes that a red and round thing is there. Here is an intu-
ition pump: if you could cycle between having the first architecture and the
second (say, once every hour), you would not even notice a difference, and
6 I assume that Williams’s constraint is that each distinct belief be realized by a distinct under-
lying representation-vehicle, for three reasons. First, Williams says that having the same
beliefs requires ‘isomorphic’ inner states (34). Second, he requires that distinct beliefs can
play distinct causal roles (34–35). Third, without ‘distinctness’, the constraint becomes com-
patible with the Lewis–Stalnaker single-state/time-slice view that he uses Blockhead to argue
against. (Incidentally, Williams would presumably restrict the constraint to core beliefs.)
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your dispositions in all circumstances would remain the same. It is implausible
that you would unnoticeably cycle between having beliefs and desires and
having none at all. Your beliefs and desires would remain the same.
Here is another example. Consider you as you are now. Now imagine a
distant counterfactual situation in which you have a twin. All the surface-
level facts about your twin described without using ‘belief’ and ‘desire’ are
the same: same inner experiences, same dispositions to behave, same use of
outer language in inner and outer speech, same causal relations between
these things, same interactions with things and people in the outside world,
and so on. If you could cycle back and forth between the actual and hypo-
thetical situations, you would not notice a difference. But there is a differ-
ence in the underlying metaphysics. In the hypothetical situation,
interactionist substance dualism is true of your twin. Indeed, he lacks a
brain (even a Blockhead-style look-up table). Instead, inputs to your twin’s
sensory organs directly cause his experiences and his experiences directly
influence his behavioural outputs. (This need not involve agent causation.)
So your twin’s experiential mental life is the same as yours but it is un-
grounded – it is not even grounded in underlying non-physical states.7
Williams’s inner isomorphism constraint again implies that your twin can-
not have the same beliefs and desires as you. But this again is implausible.
For instance, when your twin experiences a tomato and so reaches for it, he
surely also believes that a red and round thing is there, even if this belief is
not realized by an inner representation-vehicle (not even a non-physical
soul-state) mediating between experience and action. And, intuitively,
your twin can believe that either snow is white or purple pigs can fly by
virtue of understanding and accepting (in a functional sense) the outer
sentence ‘either snow is white or purple pigs can fly’, even if there is no
underlying inner state (not even a non-physical soul-state).8 If you discov-
ered that you are such a brainless non-physical subject directly interacting
with your body, you should not conclude that you lack such beliefs!
3.2 Second problem
So, Williams’s view implies that your having beliefs and desires at all is im-
plausibly hostage to hidden facts. Next we will see that it also implies that
what you believe depends on hidden facts.
7 Even if physicalism is actually true (so that our experiences are actually grounded in some-
thing more basic), it is not necessarily true. The scenario certainly cannot be excluded a priori.
8 For Williams causal-inferential basing relations are important to interpretation (35, 36ff). But
your Cartesian twin accepts some outer sentences (e.g. ‘either snow is white or purple pigs can
fly’) on the basis of accepting others (e.g. ‘snow is white’). It is just that, in him, these causal
transitions are not grounded in anything more basic. So Williams might assign contents
directly his outer language, and ground some of his beliefs in his accepting outer-language
sentences. This leads to ‘modified interpretationism’ (§5).
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Here is one example.9 Recall that Williams holds that, as a contingent mat-
ter, the relevant inner states of actual humans are sentences of an inner LOT.
Suppose that this is right. And suppose that at 10 am one day, for only
10 seconds, your hidden inner LOT terms ‘red’ and ‘green’ were interchanged
throughout your cognitive system.10 But you had no idea, because there was
no change in your surface-level experiences and dispositions: you had the same
experiences of grass and tomatoes, the same dispositions to accept (in inner
and outer speech) outer language sentences like ‘the grass looks green’, ‘by
green I mean THAT quality’, ‘the tomato looks red’ and so on. In fact, at the
time, you yourself were disposed to insist ‘I didn’t change my beliefs about
what colour qualities things appear to have!’ Given all this, it is quite clear that
there was no secret change in your beliefs about what colour qualities things
appear to have – your beliefs stayed constant while being differently realized.11
By contrast, Williams’s specific inner sentence variety of interpretationism
implies that, for 10 seconds, you secretly had radically different (and radically
mistaken) beliefs about what colour qualities things appear to have. For he
often says (43) that the correct interpretation of LOT terms is the one that is
most rationalizing overall, which might imply extreme irrationality in an iso-
lated case.
There are, then, problems for Williams’s view that hidden facts are a crucial
part of the grounds of beliefs and desires. Williams might consider an alternative
hypothesis: the minimal grounding base (and scrutability base) for your beliefs
and desires need not include certain hidden facts about realization involving inner
isomorphism and LOT. Radical interpretation does not need them. To undermine
this hypothesis, one must show that discoveries about those specific hidden facts
could make a difference to your beliefs and desires while holding all else fixed,
including all surface-level facts. But the above cases show that this is implausible.
That supports the surface-level hypothesis. If it is right, then, while you likely have
a hidden inner LOT, it is not part of the minimal grounding base. Instead, outer
language may play an important grounding role.
9 This example was suggested to me by David Chalmers. For another example, see Pautz
2021b.
10 This should be possible. After all, when the apparent colors of things switch, this causes your
inner LOT color terms to switch in kind. Why could not your LOT color terms switch
without this cause?
11 If in your sleep you become mentally ill or your brain is tampered with, you might wake up
with radically different and irrational (dispositional) beliefs, without noticing at first. But here
your dispositions to say and do things will also change. By contrast, in the red-green inter-
change case, your experiences and surface-level dispositions under all circumstances are
stipulated to remain the same. So your beliefs clearly do not radically and secretly change.
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4. Third worry: against a general mind-first approach to belief
In §1, I noted that on Williams’s variety of interpretationism ‘mental content is
metaphysically prior to linguistic content’ (146–47).
Williams does not give an argument for this. He does note (xi) that individ-
uals lacking outer language can have simple beliefs. But this does not show
that all belief content is metaphysically prior to the content of outer language.
There is another option Williams does not consider: a pluralistic variety of
interpretationism that is mind-first for simple beliefs and outer-language-first
for sophisticated beliefs (§5).
In my view, there is no convincing argument for Williams’s contrary mind-
first view that all belief content is metaphysically independent of linguistic
content. On the other hand, there is a strong argument against it.
Intuitively, there are sophisticated contents a human cannot believe if she lacks
access to an outer language expressing those contents.
To begin with, consider some things humans (ordinary people, physicists,
philosophers) can explicitly believe with outer language:
(a) There are at least 1,920,762,973 people on Earth.
(b) Either so-and-so quantum mechanical laws are true or else there exists
an alien riding on a green zebra while solving differential equations.
(c) Some people believe that they believe that within the inner sphere of
possibility everything supervenes on the physical.
Could any normal prelinguistic human believe (a)–(c)? I say no. (By a ‘normal’
human here and in what follows, I mean a human with normal human source
intentionality: the normal range of human experiences with relatively thin phe-
nomenal contents.) For instance, imagine Sally as one of our normal prelinguistic
human ancestors. Prelinguistic Sally’s group lacks any outer language – meaning
any language that they can experience. So prelinguistic Sally is also incapable of
inner speech. Now just try to describe possible cases in which prelinguistic Sally
plausibly believes (a)–(c). You cannot do it. Without an outer language, whatever
she experiences or does, it will be insufficient to ground her believing (a)–(c) rather
than some other contents.12 Most accept that there are limits on what nonlin-
guistic animals can believe. Why? Because we cannot describe a possible case in
which they believe such things. For the same reason, we should accept the same
for prelinguistic humans.
Now here is why this creates an argument against Williams’s general mind-first
view that all belief content metaphysically independent of linguistic content:
12 Perhaps a hypothetical super-experiencer could have an experience in which it phenomenally
seems to her that there are exactly 1,920,762,973 grains of sand in a pile (or whatever), and
so could believe (‘subitize’) this content by simply endorsing the content of her experience,
without needing outer language. But this is irrelevant, since here and in what follows I am
restricting the claim to a ‘normal’ prelinguistic human (i.e., one with normal thin source
intentionality).
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(1) Williams’s general mind-first theory of belief content cannot plausibly
explain why a normal prelinguistic human could not believe (a)–(c);
indeed, it arguably implies that such a human could believe (a)–(c).
(2) An alternative pluralist theory (§5) can more plausibly explain why this
cannot happen.
(3) This favours such a pluralist theory over Williams’s general mind first
approach.
The case for Premiss 1 is simple. Williams’s mind-first view holds that the
metaphysical grounds of a normal human believing (a), (b) or (c) in no way
involves the semantics of outer language; therefore, it does not involve their
having access to an outer language that can express (a), (b) or (c).13 If so, then,
whatever those grounds are, they could in principle be present in a normal
human that lacks access to an outer language that can express (a), (b) or (c).
Therefore, the mind-first approach implies that a normal prelinguistic human
(e.g. prelinguistic Sally) could in principle believe (a), (b) and (c).14
Williams might try to resist Premiss 1. He might agree that it is humanly
impossible that a normal prelinguistic human should believe (a), (b) or (c). But
he might try to explain this is in a way consistent with his mind-first approach.
But elsewhere (2021b) I present grounds for scepticism.15
13 Williams defends a form of social externalism but, as he notes (137, 145), it is compatible
with his ‘mind-first’ claim. Indeed, on Williams’s view (142), a human alone on an island who
invents a ‘private language’ could come to believe (a), (b) and (c) without outer language
being involved in the grounding story at all.
14 Of course, prelinguistic Sally could not believe (a) by way of our linguistic mode of presen-
tation ‘1,920,762,973’. But, by the argument in the text, Williams’s view does imply that
prelinguistic Sally could in principle have beliefs with contents (a), (b) and (c) where they are
understood truth-conditionally or in terms of structured Russellian propositions. (Thanks to
Williams here.)
15 Williams accepts a mind-first account on which an inner LOT is part of the grounding story.
Given this view, it is especially difficult for him to explain why prelinguistic Sally could not
believe (a), (b) or (c). For, in principle, she could have normal source intentionality and a very
rich hidden inner language, whose terms play certain complex functional roles. Why could
not that be enough to ground her believing (a), (b) and (c)? Why would she also need an outer
language? For example, in discussion, Williams suggested to me that an outer language may
be needed to be ‘sensitive to certain distinctions’. But, in principle, why could not a rich inner
language be so connected to the outside world as to enable prelinguistic Sally to be sensitive to
those distinctions? If Williams instead accepted the more ‘surface-level’ interpretationist ana-
lysis to be discussed in §5, he could explain why outer rather than inner language is required.
On that view, the concept of belief is only sensitive to the surface-level facts about an agent
(§3). So even if prelinguistic Sally has a rich subpersonal inner language, it is irrelevant to the
grounding story. In her case, the relevant surface-level facts only include her experiences,
imagery, behavior and so on. And those surface-level facts will always be insufficient to
determine that she believes (a), (b) or (c). On a surface-level analysis, only outer language
will do the trick.
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Next consider Premiss 2. I will now suggest a modified pluralist interpreta-
tionism that can plausibly explain the limits on prelinguistic thought. It also
avoids the worries I raised in previous sections.
5. Modified interpretationism?
The modified form of interpretationism I will suggest retains Williams’s basic
structure: source intentionality and then interpretationism for belief and de-
sire. Very roughly:
Modified interpretationism. A believe that p iff either A is directly assigned
the belief that p by the most rationalizing interpretations given source in-
tentionality or A is disposed to ‘accept’ (in outer or inner speech) an outer
language sentence that is correctly interpreted as meaning that p.
To illustrate, imagine that Sally belongs to a prelinguistic tribe. By virtue of
her conscious experiences and dispositions to act, she counts as believing a
limited range of simple contents about her environment in the first way. Then
her group invents an outer language that becomes increasingly sophisticated,
referring to objects and properties far outside their perceptual circle. They
retain their simple, mind-first beliefs. But, intuitively, they now have a new
way of believing more sophisticated contents: by understanding and accepting
outer language sentences correctly interpreted as expressing those contents.
As Dennett (1987: 233) says, ‘there are really two sorts of phenomena being
alluded to by folk-psychological talk about beliefs: the verbally infected states
of language-users and the deeper states of what one might call animal belief’.
Put differently, there is a single phenomenon with a plurality of grounds.
Let me explain how modified interpretationism might allow Williams to
avoid the three worries I raised.
First, modified interpretationism might include Sally’s richly intentional, intern-
ally determined conscious experiences within ‘source intentionality’ (§2). This
source intentionality helps fix her language-independent beliefs (first disjunct)
and also helps to fix the content of her outer language (second disjunct).16
Second, modified interpretationism only appeals to broadly surface-level
facts. Instead of assigning contents to her inner LOT, it assigns contents dir-
ectly to herself or to outer sentences she accepts, based on surface-level facts
(her experiences and dispositions, her and her community’s use of outer lan-
guage). This would allow Williams to accommodate the plausible hypothesis
(§3) that broadly surface-level facts are a minimal grounding base for her
beliefs and desires.
16 I have developed this multistage interpretationism (roughly, experiential source intentionality
and then interpretationism for the rest) in Pautz 2013 and 2021b. Source intentionality need
not only include narrow experiential content; it can also include wide facts about what ex-
ternal objects and kinds Sally counts as perceiving and acting on.
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Third, modified interpretationism would allow Williams to neatly explain
another intuitive datum (§4): no matter what she does, a prelinguistic human
with the normal range of experiences cannot believe extremely sophisticated
contents such as (a), (b) or (c).
For instance, consider prelinguistic Sally back when she belonged to a primitive
tribe. Suppose she has a magical subpersonal mechanism that can detect only one
condition: exactly 1,920,762,973 grains of sand before her. When this happens, it
causes her to decide to scratch her head, apparently out of the blue. But she has
normal human experiences. So it does not then experientially appear to prelin-
guistic Sally that exactly 1,920,762,973 grains of sand are there. It just experien-
tially appears to her that a whole lot of grains of sand are there.
To rationalize her head-scratching, should we attribute to prelinguistic Sally
the belief that exactly 1,920,762,973 grains of sand are before her, and the
desire to scratch her head when this is so? Intuitively not. She herself has no
idea exactly how many grains are sand are there (even if her subpersonal
mechanism detects this precise number) – just as you would have no idea.
Modified interpretationism can explain this. The correct assignment of
beliefs and desires to prelinguistic Sally must be congruent not just with her
dispositions to act but also with the reasons provided by her conscious expe-
riences. But since those reasons are limited, in explaining her dispositions to
act, it will never be correct to attribute to her any specific large number belief,
such as the belief that exactly 1,920,762,973 grains of sand are there. For the
same reason, no matter what she does, it will be never correct to assign to
prelinguistic Sally beliefs with content (a), (b) or (c).
Given modified interpretationism, then, the only way for Sally to believe
sophisticated contents like (a), (b) and (c) is outer-language-first as opposed to
mind-first. She must learn an outer language. There will be some story about
how the sentences of her outer language come to express (a), (b) and (c) that
does not appeal to an explanatorily prior ability to believe those contents. And
then she can believe those contents by ‘understanding’ and ‘accepting’ those
outer sentences. Surely this direction of explanation is possible. Why not think
it is sometimes actual?
Modified interpretationism, then, may better fit with a few features of our
concept of belief than Williams’s variety. Also, notice that, when it comes to
sophisticated beliefs, it is quite similar to his actual view. The only difference is
that while Williams holds that our believing (a), (b) and (c) is grounded in our
‘accepting’ hidden inner sentences expressing those contents, the modified
view holds that it is grounded in our ‘accepting’ outer sentences expressing
them. Therefore, in moving to modified interpretationism, he could retain his
main ideas: for instance, his rationality maximization theory of how terms and
sentences get their contents, and his functionalist theory of what it is for a
sentence to be ‘accepted’ (in the ‘belief-box’). He could simply apply them
directly to outer sentences.
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Modified interpretationism rejects Williams’s inner isomorphism constraint. So
how does it avoid the intuitively mistaken verdict that ‘Blockhead’ has beliefs and
desires (33–35)? The answer is that on modified interpretationism understanding
and therefore belief require source intentionality involving consciousness and
causal-inferential connections to such source intentionality. Blockhead is an un-
conscious robot that fails to satisfy this internal constraint.17
6. How does rationality maximization apply to ‘plus’ and ‘game’?
Finally, a general question. Williams ingeniously develops a rationality-
maximization theory of content-determination for some of Sally’s inner
LOT terms: logical terms like ‘and’, explanatory terms like ‘motion’ and moral
terms like ‘wrong’. How does the view generalize to other terms?18
For example, consider Sally’s LOT terms ‘plus’ and ‘is a game’. On
Williams’s rationality maximization view, what are the basic underlying
non-representational (inferential or dispositional) facts that determine what
they denote? And, for these two terms, what are the relevant basic principles of
substantive rationality, such that the correct assignment of denotations to
them is the one that maximizes Sally’s conformity to those principles? Is ra-
tionality really part of the explanation of how ‘is a game’ comes to express
some messy property P?
And how does Williams solve underdetermination worries here? What makes
it the case that Sally’s LOT term ‘plus’ denotes the plus-function rather than the
quusg-function – an arithmetical function like the plus-function except that it gives
deviant results for a few specific numbers in the googolplex range too large for
Sally to compute? And what makes it the case that ‘is a game’ expresses property
P rather than property P*, where P* has exactly the same extension as P across all
worlds, except that P* goes somewhat deviant relative to a single, extremely
remote world satisfying complete description D (where D is too long and alien
for Sally to understand)? Sally’s actual finite dispositions do not distinguish be-
tween these interpretations; she cannot even consider the specific remote cases.
And idealization faces well-known problems (Boghossian 2015). So would
Williams appeal to ‘naturalness’ to favour the straight interpretations over the
bent ones here (Pautz 2021a: 299–300)? If so, how might this be derived from his
general rationality maximization view?19
17 See Chalmers 2012: 467, Mendelovici 2018 and Pautz 2021a for this constraint.
18 The same question arises if we directly apply the theory to outer language, as suggested in §5.
19 In the case of explanatory terms, Williams (64) derives a naturalness constraint on interpret-
ation from his rationality maximization view (via a connection between naturalness and IBE
rationality). But ‘plus’ and ‘is a game’ are not explanatory concepts, so here it is unclear how
the derivation would go.
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